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DAVID BRAINE'S PROJECT: 
THE HUMAN PERSONI 
David Burrell, C.S.c. 
The author of The Reality of Time and the Existence of God turns his critical con-
ceptual acumen to finding an intellectually viable path between the current 
polarities of dualism and materialism. By considering human beings as lan-
guage-using animals he can critically appraise "representational" views of 
concept formation, as well as show how current "research programs" which 
presuppose a "materialist" basis stem from an unwitting adoption of a dual-
ist picture of mind and body. His alternative is rooted in classical thinkers 
like Aquinas and responsive to the critiques of Wittgenstein, yet constructive 
in ways in which those critiques failed to be. This essay aims to help readers 
undertake a taxing inquiry by guiding them through its main theses. 
This paper will have a strange rhetorical mode: meet my friend, 
David Braine. And in introducing you to my friend, I shall explain why 
he has become my friend, which involved (among other things) helping 
me unravel a conundrum which arose in the course of a philosophy col-
loquium a couple of years ago. But first, David Braine. Recently he has 
been Gifford Fellow and Lecturer in Philosophy in the University of 
Aberdeen, with a background in physics, history, and philosophy in 
Oxford from 1958 to 1965. The victim of an auto accident in 1977 which 
inflicted a spinal injury, David has had to work under incredibly con-
strained conditions since that time, though he is supported by a small 
community of students who assist him, and served ably each day by 
skilled persons from the Scottish home health care system. I was initial-
ly taken with his earlier volume (1988): The Reality of Time and the 
Existence of God, though I recognized that its inherent difficulty would 
frighten off many a prospective reader, so in my review (in Faith and 
Philosophy 7 [1990] 362-65) tried to walk people through the rich texture 
of his arguments. What struck me most was his manner of argumenta-
tion: thoroughly contemporary yet able to avail itself of the riches of a 
multi-layered philosophical tradition. That approach has the advantage 
of being able to see through and often cut through current fads; its price 
is a text freighted with allusion and never simply one-dimensional. 
Moreover, that volume presented itself as the first of a trilogy which 
promised to challenge views in metaphysics, philosophy of human 
beings and language, and epistemology. The volume I wish to focus on 
today, entitled The Human Person, was announced earlier as: "Man: 
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Animal open to the infinite." So the canvas is large, yet the arguments, 
as we shall see, are intricate. 
The conundrum which this volume addressed for me was provoked 
when a colleague introduced our local philosophy colloquium to "cogni-
tive science" a few years ago, using something called "folk psychology" 
as a springboard. I didn't know much about what people called "cogni-
tive science," though I had worked with an NSF-sponsored research 
group on "artificial intelligence" some years back, but what made it 
worse was that I couldn't recognize myself as a "folk psychologist" 
either. Nor, any of the novelists whom I respected as narrators of human 
action: D. H. Lawrence, Toni Morrison, Leo Tolstoy, Naguib Mahfouz-
to name a representative list. In fact, I recalled at that time a strategy 
which I had learned from philosophical mentors like J.L. Austin, Ryle, 
Strawson, and Wittgenstein, about the logical peculiarities involved in 
ascribing actions to human beings. And as well as I could understand 
the supposed vagaries of "folk psychology," the accounts these philoso-
phers gave of ascription, as well as the practice of my cherished novelists, 
seemed to escape most all of them.2 So I was thrilled to find David 
Braine beginning his extended essay with a reference to Austin, Ryle, 
and the later Wittgenstein, noting their contribution to his own forma-
tion in these questions, but also acknowledging that they had eschewed, 
and quite deliberately so, a search for explanation. Science, in fact, was 
not their paradigm for understanding, which it explicitly is for "cogni-
tive science." One way of stating the aim of Braine's book is that it is to 
address the issue of explanation which they left hanging, but to do so in 
a idiom which does justice to the subjects involved-human persons. 
I had also sensed some affinity between the opposition-folk psychol-
ogy / cognitive science-and Wilfrid Sellars' celebrated manifest/ scien-
tific images. In elaborating that difference, Sellars had noted how 
explaining why gases expand when heated had to involve more than 
covering laws, and in fact required a hypothetical step: were gases so 
constituted as to allow Newton's laws to offer an account why expan-
sion occurred under heating, we would have an explanation. And if 
something of this sort worked for gases, why not for thoughts? We all 
know why not, of course, since thoughts are intentional in character, 
with this curious of- or about-structure, which decomposition into mole-
cules doesn't help to explain. For Sellars, thoughts become roles in a 
working language, for which he could never find a correlate susceptible 
of "scientific explanation," for human society and its norms (for him) are 
adumbrated in the inherent normativity of speech, which is not itself 
susceptible of assimilation to the "scientific image." Does it then belong 
to the "manifest image," or could it be that explanation in human affairs 
resists such bifurcation? 
So Sellars' initial dichotomy may help us to a more adequate diagno-
sis of the difficulty that is emerging: is everything we confront or wish 
to know better to be known better by presuming that the language of 
our initial confrontation is a commonsensical one which needs to be 
replaced by an explanatory one? It was, of course, this presumption 
which the later Wittgenstein, along with Ryle and Austin, combatted in 
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various therapeutic ways, leading us to appreciate how sophisticated 
"ordinary" modes of expression can be in certain domains, and so more 
in need of explicating than of replacing. Yet, as Braine remarks, their 
work proved to be more destructive of inappropriate explanatory para-
digms and of an apriori insensitivity to "ordinary" discourse than it was 
constructive. In any case, it did not eradicate the impulse to explain 
human behavior, and one sign of that fact is a curious current amnesia 
regarding their animadversions, along with an entire research project 
proceeding according to paradigms they would have found odd: "man-
ifest/ scientific image," "folk psychology" /" cognitive science." 
David Braine wants to bridge the gap between the generations by 
acknowledging that one cannot suppress the lure of explaining, but that 
the issue is how to do so. Rather than accepting uncritically a specific 
"scientific" paradigm, he begins by asking what it is that is to be 
explained, and given that fact, how one ought best to go about it. (Here 
we see the first sign of his radically Aristotelian orientation: different 
kinds of things may have to be explained differently.) We must begin, 
he insists, with human persons (rather than with "mental events") and 
their characteristic modes of acting, and press for a non-dualistic 
account of them. To get a proper focus on the landscape and to clarify 
his goal with a diagnosis of the difficulties to be unravelled, he details 
the structural similarity between dualist and naturalist accounts. Recall 
what seemed to remove thoughts from the "scientific image" -their 
aboutness. The temptation for one who wishes to bring them into line is 
to focus on such characteristics and ask how they can be translated into 
a language amenable to scientific explanation. This will involve a strate-
gy of reifying things identified as "mental states" or "events," and then 
trying to identify them with states of the brain or another purportedly 
physical part of humans.3 So if Descartes is the father of dualists, he 
becomes the grandfather of "eliminative materialists," for they must 
eliminate what their fathers postulated, yet in doing so they leave the 
form of analysis relatively untouched. 
Braine's alternative seeks above all to eschew the inner/outer divide, 
especially with regard to paradigms of explanation. So he will replace 
Descartes' demarcation into two proper domains of explanation-spirit 
and body, with Aristotle's strate gem that there are in fact different kinds 
of things to be explained in a manner proper to their differences. So 
Braine puts forth his approach as holistic, in a way which appeals to the 
converging indicators in our midst which question the utility of 
Descartes' demarcation." As he puts it: "dualist and materialist alike 
are committed not only to a mythology of inner experiences and 'acts of 
will' as things we must, in their view attribute to or predicate of human 
beings. But also they are committed to this mythology as part of a more 
general mythology of 'events', 'states', and 'processes', as objects to be 
the terms of causal relations-it always being one real object (say, an 
event) which causes another real object (a different event)"(59). In this 
way, "regularity theories of causation conspire together with the 
requirements of the dualist/materialist account of man and animals to 
make one regard states and events as objects in a metaphysical sense 
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and the only real causes, if real causes exist-[thusl reducing agent-cau-
sation to event causation"(60). 
According to the more holistic paradigm of substance-causation, 
moreover, the search for a properly descriptive language will offer the 
key to what is properly explanatory. And for human beings and ani-
mals, that description "is irreducibly holistic or hybrid, [with] reference 
to the mental and the physical inextricable from each other within 
it"(61). Nor is it simply that both languages are needed, but that they 
interpenetrate: it is crucial to human beings' being the linguistic animals 
we are that we are of flesh and blood! In this sense, then, "it is quite 
wrong to speak of this bodily being, animal or human, as essentially a 
'material entity' or 'material body'."(63). Such opening salvos require, 
of course, that he show what an explanation of this holistic, "substance" 
sort would look like; and not merely negatively (as Austin, Ryle, or 
Wittgenstein) but constructively as well. That is, besides showing that 
event-paradigms won't do it, he must offer alternatives which will satis-
fy our demand for explanation, showing how it is that "intention is not 
the extrinsic cause of certain physical bodily movements, but is the 
mode of the exercise of causality involved when an animal or human 
being executes a bodily action intentionally." In this way, "the human 
being or animal, acting according to its nature in the mode of causal 
agency proper to it, ... acts bodily in the world"(68). As one might sus-
pect, his guides in this enterprise will be Aristotle above all, with assis-
tance at crucial points from Aquinas and Merleau-Ponty; and for 
philosophers that may be one of the more arresting features of his 
extended project. 
Once he has shown how dualists and materialists share a dualistic 
paradigm for explanatory discourse regarding human beings, Braine 
constructs his alternative "substance" account in stepwise fashion. He 
begins with perception, displaying it "as a direct cognitive relation with 
the world," relating "an active exploring animal to a world perceived as 
a field of action"(69). This will involve deconstructing the '"cinemato-
graph model' of perception"(75) for one in which "neither the visual 
world nor the tactile world is a thing previously given to which the 
other is an extra. Rather there is one world within which I move, see, 
and feel" (75)-language reminiscent of the work of Oliver Sacks. In a 
world in which substances are the primary agents there is no neutral 
perception-language; rather there are diverse uses of the verb 'to see', as 
Austin was wont to remind us. Or following Merleau-Ponty, "the inten-
tional object of .. perception is a real object ... to which behaviour is 
adapted [in such a way] that there is no way of logically segregating or 
isolating knowledge of the 'experience' in perception from knowledge of 
this nested ness or from knowledge of this relation"(97).5 In this way, 
perception is presented as the act of "a wandering, exploring, active 
agent" and not "that of a pure observer, a mind in abstraction from 
physical activity" (131). Indeed, the purpose of these two chapters on 
perception is to make conceptual room for an "irreducible kind of 
agency, a kind characteristic of animals and human beings with the 
mental and physical integrated and inseparable"(132). 
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The following two chapters (4 and 5) put that effort in a larger context 
by linking such agency with a distinct mode of being proper to humans 
and animals, recalling us to Strawson's early work with P-predicates. 
Then Braine will be poised to argue for the primacy of agent- over 
event-causation, at least in the case of humans and animals (Ch. 6), and 
from there to challenge any presumption in favor of mechanistic expla-
nation as well as argue for the possible autonomy of teleological expla-
nation (Ch. 7). That will give him the conceptual tools to construct his 
"first refutation of mechanism," arguing for psychophysical unity at the 
level of explanation (Ch. 8), and completing part I with an overview of 
the community between human beings and other animals (Ch. 9): 
"these realities compel us to treat both human beings and other higher 
animals as wholes"(339). As if that did not suffice to make good his 
promise of a constructive alternative account of the agency proper to 
human beings, part II moves from the perspective of what we hold in 
common with higher animals to treat "the human being as spirit: 
human transcendence revealed in language"(343). Here a consideration 
of the suppleness of human linguistic response (Ch. 10) sets him up for 
two chapters on the "simpleness of thought," (to use a medieval idiom), 
one phenomenological (Ch. 11), the other explanatory (Ch. 12): "the sec-
ond refutation of mechanism: linguistic understanding and thinking 
have no bodily organ"(447). These are followed by a non-dualistic 
account of soul (Ch. 13), offering both phenomenological and explanato-
ry uses of the expression, culminating with two chapters on the tran-
scendence proper to human beings: the first using the language of 'soul' 
(Ch. 14) and the second casting the argument in terms proper to human 
being as such (Ch. 15). 
It would be out of the question to canvass his entire project, but I shall 
give some soundings of the key deconstructive chapter (6) with its con-
structive complement (7), where he tries to overcome current fascination 
with event-causation and offer as its replacement a proposal introduc-
ing a different mode of causality proper to agents. Then I shall assess 
the force of his considerations regarding the capacities endemic to the 
human use of language (Ch. 10), noting how these reinforce his earlier 
remarks about the mode of causality proper to agents; and finish by 
explicating his use of 'soul' in both its phenomenological and explanato-
ry senses, showing how he carries though this Aristotelian project in a 
nondualist fashion. The recurring theme which shapes his argumenta-
tion regards the need to explain human agency. Just as perception for 
animals can only be understood in the context of their active exploration 
of the world about them, so human intentional activity, as evidenced 
both in the range of operations endemic to language as well as our 
capacity to harness them to make a single point, manages to focus what 
otherwise would remain disparate. It is this anti-entropic, unifying 
character of human activity (at its best) which argues to the need for a 
unified subject of such activity to which it can justly be attributed. And 
what gives unity to the human person in its activity must also be the 
source of that activity. Here is where the Aristotelian notion of psyche, 
adopted and modified by Aquinas as a soul subsistent bodily for the his-
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tory of the individual human person, can be called upon. For it is this 
principle which will account for specifically human activity, and by its 
relative transcendence of bodily conditions, open the person for direct 
relationship with God, and so for the gift of eternal life. That is the 
direction implicit in Braine's talk of "human transcendence," though his 
philosophical argumentation carries one but to the threshold of such 
positive affirmations. Indeed, as we shall see, his argument can be pur-
sued independent of the use of soul (or psyche), though not of the need 
for a principle to explain the activity proper to human agents. 
That need to explain activity fuels his scrutiny of the metaphysics 
endemic to much current discourse purporting to explain human action, 
which he dubs "the mythology of events and states as objectsl/(204). He 
reminds us that "the primary way of referring to events is not by means 
of noun expressions such as 'Alfred's striking of Bridget with his fist in 
the sitting room at 2 p.m.', but by means of propositional expressions 
such as 'Alfred struck Bridget with his fist in the sitting room at 2 
p.m."'(204). The form of such statements calls our attention to the pri-
macy of the person whose name take the subject place, and serves 
Braine's attempt to supplant a vaguely "platonist" ontology which 
grants equal status to substances, properties, relations, and events, with 
an Aristotelian one which privileges substances as that of which actions 
are predicated. He takes time to answer some of Davidson's objections 
to the capacity of sentences adequately to identify events, noting that 
they do so in use (206), but goes on to question the utility of introducing 
"a theory of properties or features as objects as if it were explanatory," 
reminding us that "'object' is not a genus, and that the things we speak 
of belong to different categories, and that the nature and criteria of iden-
tity for subordinate categories ... require to be explained in terms of 
statements about more fundamental categories" (21 0). 
Indeed, "the grand mistake involved in the mythology we are attack-
ing is the mistake of explaining what it is for Smith's car to collide with 
the wall by saying that it consists in the existence of this object, the colli-
sion which Smith's car and the wall engage in"(211). It is that mytholo-
gy which leads us to "ask the peculiar question as to what is the relation 
between an agent and his or her actionl/(225). The natural response to 
that "seems to be that the agent is the logical subject of the action and 
that the action is predicated of the agent.I/ In that way, "causativity is 
internal to the sense of the verb phrase in such predications as aspect 
and tense are internal to itl/(226). Braine suggests that the alternative 
way of "thinking of the agent and the action as both objects, distinct 
objects between which there is a relationl/(226), has its roots "in a certain 
way of presenting Humean theories of explanationl/(220), whereas 
explaining the event as "the outcome of the action and interaction of dif-
ferent natures at work in the world [makes it] natural to envisage differ-
ent modes of causal action, and there is no temptation to be captivated 
by the physical case exemplified by the billiard ballI/ (224). Furthermore, 
"this accords with the commonsense: my being the cause of my kicking 
the football is nothing other than the action's being 'from me', nothing 
other than its being me that kicked the footballl/(226). If that's the way it 
OAVlO BRAINE'S PROJECT 169 
is with full-bodied human action, it seems gratuitous to object "that the 
remark that I caused the action has no explanatory power, because it 
does not imply a connection between one event and another in a context 
of circumstances in which the later event, independently specifiable, fol-
lows according to law from the earlier event ... since no respectable 
proof has been offered of the doctrine that explanations ... must take this 
form"(227). 
So we see that Braine is arguing for replacing a reductive picture 
"that causal connection is between events or states each of which is a 
'logically distinct existence', [with one of] causal agents with different 
types of disposition entering into explanation in different ways"(224). It 
is this Aristotelian methodological presumption which governs both his 
deconstructive and his constructive efforts, and why it is crucial to his 
extended argument to "dethrone events," in order to "be able to see 
human and animal life as focalized upon the human beings and animals 
concerned, not only at the level of experience and description, but also at 
the level of explanation and reality"(227). Indeed, calling into question a 
single paradigm for causality will allow him to recover the attention 
which Austin, Ryle, and the later Wittgenstein gave to description and 
especially to ascription of actions, and then proceed to a manner of 
explaining which need not postulate a chasm between "manifest and sci-
entific images" in the explanation of human action. This will involve 
rescuing "causal agency, which is a kind of criterion of being real, from 
the prison of mechanism and accord it its full generality, so that the pro-
totypical examples of causal agents will be, not billiard balls, but per-
sons and animals exercising a mode of causality which is intentional or 
directed" (235). The unflattering "prison of mechanism" implies a chal-
lenge: "there is no epistemological reason to suppose that a tendency or 
disposition towards an end has to be conceived of as a state of some 
apparatus or mechanism, whether material or immaterial"(231). The 
background is "Aristotle's conception of state or (in modern parlance) 
'disposition' (hexis, dynamis) which was quite open and not at all tied to 
the idea of being the resultant of the state of an apparatus" (232). 
This challenge is integral to Braine's project, so he must go on to 
explain why it is initially so arresting. He feels that "the compulsion 
often felt towards mechanical models" springs not only "from misun-
derstandings of what is involved in teleological explanations" but also 
from "certain false presumptions of a quasi-logical kind: ... the sense that 
any tendency, disposition, or state even if initially understood teleologi-
cally must be ultimately describable as the state of some system, appara-
tus, set-up, or mechanism, whether material or mental"(243). He contin-
ues: "the 'real' is then supposed to need to bear some analogy or like-
ness to such physical structures [so that] unless predications or ascrip-
tions of states or dispositions involve something about some such 'sub-
stantial' set-up ... the predication or ascription must be empty." And 
once that presumption is granted, it will also be presumed that when 
such states or dispositions "are historically explanatory of some physical 
movement, this is because the state which they denote (qua state of a set-
up or apparatus) is mechanically causative of what they explain"(244). 
170 Faith and Philosophy 
Yet allowing oneself to be mesmerized by such a concatenation of pre-
sumptions evacuates the kind of causality peculiar to intentional agents 
and offers to "explain" it in ways which offer no specific illumination 
regarding such actions. So, for example, he reminds us that it belongs to 
our grasp of Illan understanding of a proof of Pythagoras' theorem' that 
the person who has it should in principle be able to explain to another 
person how to prove this theorem," yet what is added "by bringing in a 
theory of structured states of brain or soul and showing how these 
might be mechanically productive of the same sound-effects from the 
person's mouth'(246)? "There indeed has to be something about the 
person which makes it true that he or she has a belief, or has under-
standing, ... but this does not have to be represented as picturable"(247). 
This sets his task: "to envisage ... the way ascriptions of perception, sen-
sation, emotion and intention have meaning independently of this form 
of material rooting" (248). 
The final two chapters of Part I of The Human Person pull together 
these threads into an account of "holistic explanation" which accepts 
human beings and animals as "basic entities." For they are the subjects 
of statements "which involve teleology ineliminably" (288), and so quite 
naturally exclude explanation in terms of mechanisms. Yet to say that 
they are basic entities and so need to be considered holistically need not 
militate against their being considered in terms of their physical parts, so 
long as it be understood that "in these physical treatments we are 
abstracting certain aspects of human and animal life ... from the life and 
behaviour of human beings or animals as wholes which can only be 
understood holistically, teleologically-understood as organic psy-
chophysical unities"(250). Once again, the guide is Aristotle, and 
notably the "reciprocity between the macroscopic and the minute ... 
which is the hallmark of Aristotle's conception of nature, and .,. pro-
vides the key to the understanding of human beings and animals" (261). 
That is, for such organic wholes, the parts cannot properly be under-
stood apart from their functional relation to the whole organism, and 
judgments of identity will be a function of one's perception of natural 
wholes. 
This is the sense in which Braine is relying upon the notion of sub-
stance throughout-as "the logical subject of concrete predicates"(256), 
and not a particular philosophical notion privileging any metaphysical 
viewpoint. Indeed, this strategy allows us to glimpse how he will pre-
sent a non-dualistic account of sOlll, for he need not endorse "the 
Kantian distinction between the phenomenon and the noumenon; ... all 
that is required are such things as the refusal to eliminate the category of 
causal agent in favour of the categories of event and state, the refusal to 
explain the notion of causal action in terms of the notion of law, the 
refusal to treat laws as all of one kind as if either all or none were non-
teleological in form, and the refusal to treat laws at any level as an a11-
determining system"(284-5). So he will insist that "teleological and 
holistic ways of thinking arise without any dependence on the introduc-
tion of abstract terms such as soul or vital force or energy, or even dispo-
sition, all such abstract modes of speech being circumlocutory for talk 
DAVID BRAINE'S PROJECT 171 
about substances, that is, causal agents exercising different modes of 
causality" (285). This is the sense in which he seeks to show a continuity 
rather than a chasm between ascription and explanation. 
Before taking up the second part of his intended argument, where he 
uses the complex fact of language use to argue for human transcen-
dence, he concludes part I with an extended treatment of the community 
of human beings with other animals. This community has been evident 
in many passages cited, where the reference is invariably to "human 
beings and other animals;" for Braine, as for Aristotle, humans are ani-
mals who can speak: talking animals. This fact affects the ways in 
which we exercise the very faculties by which we outstrip animals, and 
it undergirds a non-dualist account of those functions, seeing them as 
united with a "body with organsl/(336) even when a specific function 
may not require an organic correlate. If we cannot "relegate the other 
animals to the level of biological mechanisms," we must then "treat both 
human beings and the higher animals as wholes"(339). That has been 
Braine's overriding methodological presumption throughout, and it will 
continue to guide him as he explores human transcendence. We should 
note another concern as well, as we take stock of what has been said and 
contemplate a briefer look at part II. His reliance on Aristotle as a viable 
alternative to Descartes, as well as his desire to bring the work of Austin, 
Ryle, and the later Wittgenstein into creative contact with more recent 
attempts at explaining human action, display a some features of his 
approach to philosophy. He clearly does not see philosophy in a vulgar 
Hegelian way as a series of "positions" each of which replaces the other, 
thereby rendering the earlier ones "obsolete." Instead he respects the 
fact that the sorts of issues which we probe in philosophical inquiry are 
for various reasons quite intractable. So we need all the help we can get! 
Besides, presuming that later developments are in fact developments; that 
is, that they can be seen as simple replacements of earlier conceptual 
efforts, removes any capacity for dialogue among these views, and cer-
tainly impoverishes any current inquiry. 
Moreover, such methodological warnings have substantive implica-
tions, and these would seem to form Braine's central concern. That is, 
we can become so enamored of a particular method of inquiry that we 
can lose sight of "chat it is we are seeking to understand. That was cer-
tainly the force of Wittgenstein's "therapeutic" approach to the very 
way of posing "philosophical issues"; be sure that the questions you are 
asking are rcnl questions! Braine is clearly concerned that a set of current 
strategies in "philosophy of mind" may in fact be missing their subject-
the human person. We have other ways of detecting when philosophy 
begins to miss its mark, of course. It shows up when we have to spend 
an inordinate amount of time "motivating" our students to grapple with 
the "problems" as we present them, or (as I have already noted) when 
we need to caricature an alternative approach to place our preferred one 
on the table. (In my area of philosophical theology, the danger signals 
emerge when people wonder whether the being we are talking so much 
about could ever be God? Indeed, this has moved some colleagues to 
eschew all conferences on "philosophy of religion" out of respect for 
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their faith in God!) It is this sense which has led Braine to have recourse 
to Aristotle and to substance- or agent-causality rather than prefer a 
replacement ontology of events and states. His deconstruction of that 
approach was designed to ask us why we might prefer it? His construc-
tive efforts in part II, notably with the Aristotelian notion of soul and 
with its particular elaboration at the hands of Aquinas, intend to show 
that there is a non-dualist way between the apparent alternatives of 
Cartesian dualism and eliminative materialism. 
In his remarks introducing part II, Braine reminds us once again of 
his central thesis: "the mental is inextricably linked, logically and not 
just causally, with the patterns of bodily behaviour in which it is reflect-
ed"(345). It is this contention which drives his holism: "if we could get 
away from the false idea of animals as biological machines, and recover 
the conception of an animal as an organic whole with a certain kind of 
life requiring its nature and behaviour to be understood holistically, we 
could regard the statement 'the human being is an animal' as precisely 
capturing our central contention"(346). It is against this positive back-
ground, having critically linked materialists together with Cartesians as 
dualists, that he sets out to "explore the significance of language as what 
differentiates human beings from other animals"(347). His treatment of 
language (in Ch. 10) is rich and provocative, yet all the while prelimi-
nary, for he has promised a full-length treatment of language to com-
plete the triptych. It turns on the fact that "the whole working of lan-
guage involves understanding at two levels, an understanding of langue 
in virtue of which words or elements of speech have some meaning in 
their own right and an understanding of parole or speech, which is the 
exercise of the underlying understanding of lallgue"(348). The upshot of 
this observation will be that a natural language must contain its own 
metalanguage to do the job it does, and that those of us who regularly 
make use of such languages will need to be equipped by nature to do 
just that. 
Those arguments will lead to his nondualist presentation of soul, a 
reality which he will elaborate as Aristotle does for human beings and 
for animals, with certain features specific to humans, which he attributes 
to Aquinas. These signal what we have called "human transcendence," 
for Aquinas "suggested that, although the human soul has to originate 
with the body and needs the body for its natural mode of functioning, 
nonetheless it has an existence in its own right because it has an opera-
tion in its own right, namely, understanding" (349). David Braine feels, 
however, that "for us, the primary way of suggesting this transcendence 
should not be in terms of the soul existing in its own right and not by 
right of the body, but in terms of the human being existing in its own 
right and not by right of the body because it, the human being, has states 
and operations which are not bodily"(350). The language of "soul," it 
would seem, has become so infected by Cartesian dualistic perspectives 
that it will invariably trigger "folk psychology" scenarios, so best leave it 
to one side. Yet Braine will show how it can be employed properly, so 
long as we remind ourselves, as Aquinas took pains to do as well, that 
"ways of speaking about the soul are embedded and underpinned by 
DAVID BRAINE'S PROJECT 173 
ways of speaking about the human being as such"(350). 
Braine's view of human language turns on its "expressiveness": 
words are expressive because of the double way in which they have 
meaning: lexically and in use. And both dimensions-langue and 
parole-are essential and interpenetrating: "it is because the words we 
use in speech ... are nodes of understanding in their own right, that 
when we use them in speech they are able to express something with the 
result that the speech itself expresses something"(353). The interaction 
of langue and parole is displayed in the relation between words and sen-
tences: "the sentence, its sense, and the senses of the words as functors 
or as in use are all constituted in the act of utterance, as the sound of a 
trill or musical sequence is constituted in the act of performance." 
Hence "we say that the words express a sense, the sense of the sentence, 
words and sentence having sense in the same act"(371). Yet there is a 
crucial difference: "the home of the the notion of sentence is only at the 
level of speech or parole, and of function"(372). It follows from this that 
"the capacity to understand linguistically expressed concepts ... is not 
separable from the capacity to use them rightly in judgments"(365), and 
that "the fundamental mistake of most recent semantic theory [is] to 
conceive a sentence as primarily a unit of langue with a settled meaning 
determined by the langue-meanings of its grammatical components and 
their mode of combination"(374). 
Such a brief sketch can only provoke, but what Braine wishes to 
evoke here is one's own sense of the open-ended-cum-unitary or inte-
grated character of language-in-use, as we are all language users. 
Moreover, "in learning and using language, our starting point is not the 
identifying or picking out particular meanings ... but in each case the 
understanding of the meaning of some expression"(387). That is, words 
express what we want them to when we use them in sentences, and 
"what is involved no more involves calculation from langue-meanings 
than walking involves calculation from muscle properties and rela-
tions"(386). And if "there can be no calculation of the parole-meaning of 
sentences (utterances) from the langue-meaning of elements of 
langue"(390), then language use is not susceptible of computer simula-
tion. If "there is no set of rules governing the interpretation of speech-
sentences utilizing a given element of langue," then we must rather 
acknowledge that "the knowledge of langue is given a skilled and situa-
tion-geared use by the users of language: ... knowledge of the lallgue-
meaning of a word is a potential towards an indefinitely wide spread of 
meanings-in-use or parole-meanings"(395). His sense of the holistic char-
acter of human agency is reflected in our use of language. And his 
predilection for the term "expressive" adumbrates his extended critique 
(in the following chapter) of representational accounts of thinking. 
Reference is a small part of language use, subordinate to expressing 
what one means. What best characterizes language use is the activity of 
judgment, and our use of general concepts in judging "cannot be 
explained in terms of abstract ideas as objects to the mind"(412). It is 
this axial point that thinking is to be explained by reference to the activi-
ty of language use, and notably of using language to make judgments, 
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which leads him to his central contention in chapter 12: that "linguistic 
understanding and thinking have no bodily organ"(447). 
Yet interestingly enough, while chapter 12 is entitled "the second 
refutation of mechanism"(447), it does not introduce any new notions, 
but rather recapitulates his reflections on language use and the kind of 
subject one would have to be to "use words in an indefinite number of 
logically distinguishable types of use .... The structure of [such] linguis-
tic capacity involves a judging subject and within it structures of self-
reflection and of reflection on procedures of coming to judgments. This 
structure is unitary in such a way that, without these and other essential 
substructures, there would be no capacity for language or linguistic 
understanding or for thought in the medium of words. But there could 
not be any mechanically operating system which exemplified these 
structures ... (451). The set of reasons for that cluster under what he calls 
"the 'allusiveness' of thought (its 'intentionality' in one sense of that 
word): every utterance or thought is pregnant with the whole inter-con-
nectedness and structure of language" (452). This "allusiveness" picks 
up his insistence on the "expressiveness" of language, which displaces a 
propensity to consider thinking representationally: "the possession or 
use of a concept is not the bringing of an internal object (an 'idea' or rep-
resentation) into relation with the object to which it is applied, but the 
saying-the expressing-of something"(452). On such a view of saying 
and thinking, "the occurrence of material processes precisely correlated 
with the procedure of understanding and thinking becomes not only 
impossible-there can be no such precise correlation-but also redun-
dant, serving no purpose in explanation" (453). So he concludes: "the 
road to understanding [the structures of langue and parole] more deeply 
lies in what we may think of as the human or holistic sciences, not in 
delving into the realm of material explanation" (454). 
Before proceeding to his final chapters, which seek to rehabilitate the 
notion of soul in a noncartesian manner, and then show how one may 
either use such a notion or dispense with it to speak of the manner in 
which humans may be said to transcend animals, a word of reflection on 
his mode of argumentation might be in order. Braine is engaged in a 
large project of sketching an alternative to currently fashionable ways of 
doing philosophy of human nature, often called "philosophy of mind." 
That very title is, of course, misleading if one purports to be speaking of 
the kind of thing we are, and the fact that much of what goes on there 
proceeds from "materialist" presumptions seems to corroborate his ini-
tial alignment of such materialists with Cartesian dualism. Yet his alter-
native does not rely, as does John Searle's, for example, on something 
nonmaterial called "consciousness;" in fact, it deliberately eschews that 
tack. Holism is not a merely honorific notion for him; it is at the heart of 
his call for a mode of explanation properly fitted to its subject: human 
beings. It is that call, Aristotelian in inspiration, which seems to me to 
be his most constructive challenge to a fresh perspective in thinking 
about human beings. For it exploits the reminders of "ordinary lan-
guage philosophers" about the peculiarities endemic to ascribing things 
to humans and yet links us with the larger organic world of which we 
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are a part. And in doing so, it relies on our sense of ourselves, avoiding 
tendentious attempts to make us think differently about who and what 
we are than we are wont to do. So it seems that the persuasiveness of 
his cumulative argument will depend on the manner in which he can 
make that nondualist holistic alternative available to us, especially in 
arguing for "human transcendence." 
The final three chapters build on his conclusion to chapter 12: "it 
clearly follows that the human being cannot be a mechanical system and 
that, in operations involving self-reflection, including these kinds of rea-
soning to conclusions in natural arithmetic, the human being does not 
operate as if it even might be a mechanical system. But does it also fol-
low that mechanical processes are not internal to the procedures of 
understanding and judging involved, as they are internal to the proce-
dures of seeing, suffering emotion, and so forth"(471)? His own answer 
to that question is offered explicitly as a reformulation of Aquinas' insis-
tence "that no material faculty can reflect upon itself: ... there can be iso-
morphism between part of the material faculty and the whole but noth-
ing corresponding to a judgement by the whole in regard to the whole-
no reproduction in the material organism of the structure whereby the 
organism in critical judgement reflects upon itself or critically (reflective-
ly) judges"(472). It is an intuitive form of that judgment which he asso-
ciates with what he calls the "concrete and phenomenological" notion of 
soul, one which "is represented in the primordial agreement as to which 
workings or 'operations' of the human being or animal are to be ranked 
as workings or operations of soul: seeing and hearing, being pleased 
and being distressed, wanting, hoping, being afraid, being angry, believ-
ing and intending, remembering, imagining and thinking, and such-
like"(481). He notes that these are "the ways of thinking which misled 
Plato and Descartes, but which are not in themselves at all tied to dual-
ism-represented in Aristotle throughout his De Anima, relied upon by 
Aquinas in his demonstrations of human unity, and still drawn upon in 
the sayings of Merleau-Ponty and Wittgenstein"(482). 
Yet for all that, "we know perfectly well that the human being and the 
animal are proper subjects of all these operations"(487), and as Aquinas 
puts it: "my soul is not I" (491). So it is no wonder that an item intro-
duced as the subject of such significant concrete predicates could easily 
be taken to be a basic entity, a substance, and so spawn the dualism 
regarding human beings which makes "folk psychology" less of a carica-
ture. And this is particularly true in human beings, of course, as the 
gathering tendency of David Braine's cumulative arguments focuses on 
the subject of certain operations which are not usefully understood in 
material terms. If this subject were "the soul" then we seem effectively 
launched into a dualist conception of human beings. So Braine takes 
pains to try to restore us to Aristotle: "the soul ... is an 'as-if-sub-
stance' -a quasi-substance" (490). That is, it seems to arise spontaneous-
ly as we consider our intentional activities, yet "it" is not thereby some-
thing to which we have privileged access. So nothing "epistemological-
ly private [or] subjective" follows from our using the term: '''souls' are 
not parts of mythology, but elements in a dramatic idiom of speech 
176 Faith lind Philosophy 
which we can understand whether or not we adopt it"(495). Moreover, 
if we allow ourselves to be so spooked by Cartesian pre-conceptions as 
to eschew the idiom completely, then remarks like "Wittgenstein's ... 
that 'The human body is the best picture of the human soul' and 'My 
attitude towards him is an attitude towards a soul. I am not of the opin-
ion that he has a soul' ... read like unintelligible archaisms"(496). 
So what needs to be done is to recover the phenomenological, "as-if" 
character of soul-talk, and note how it can be integrated with Aristotle's 
conception of soul as lithe form of a living bodily thing, lwhichl of itself 
constitutes a scandal to materialism. For it means that the physics-
including here the chemistry, physiology, and even neurology-of living 
bodies is only an abstraction, the separating out for attention, of just one 
aspect of a reality which is not merely physical in the modern 
sense"(498). A perspective of that sort reminds us of the writings of 
Oliver Sacks and orients us to the sense of Braine's "holism," so allow-
ing us to see better what is going on in this primordial language of soul. 
It also offers us a way of resolving what seems to be a tension with 
Aquinas' insistence that the human soul is a candidate for subsisting "in 
its own right" by virtue of humans' being the subject of operations 
which need not involve the body internally. For he will also insist that 
"the soul as subject of intellection is none other than the form of the 
body conceived in an Aristotelian way"(503), and he must do so to 
assure the unity of the human being. What happens in this privileged 
human case is that the Aristotelian notion of form-itself a "formal 
notion"(511)-assumes a specific kind of reference tailored to the tran-
scendence proper to human beings. 
And if that response sounds unsatisfying, there is another tack one 
can take: bypass the language of soul altogether as an explanatory lan-
guage, and go to the source of Aquinas' recasting of Aristotelian sub-
stance in terms of essence and existence. That is, we mayor may not be 
able to recover the primordial or phenomenological language of soul, 
and so it may not prove particularly useful to invoke its Aristotelian 
explanatory side either. This entire enterprise may involve too great an 
effort to recover a familiarity with Aristotelian or Thomist technical lan-
guage as well. Braine has already suggested that such efforts are not 
required, since is it the human being, after all, who is the authentic sub-
ject of those operations which bespeak transcendence. So Braine moves 
in the final chapter to recover a "positive" notion of existence-lithe 
existing of a substance as an actuality in the world always consists in 
some activity"(535)-recapitulating themes he developed in his earlier 
book." If "substances are the primary subjects of existence and this in 
virtue of being subjects of predicates ascribing action or activity" -the 
thesis prevailing throughout this work, what he is now saying "is that 
this existing of substances is itself an 'activity', 'going on', or 'actuali-
ty"'(536). To be sure, "not an action or act predicated of what exists but 
presupposed to any predication"(537). That is to say, existence is not to 
be thought of as a minimal floor, an "off/on" concept, as might have 
been suggested to many on the pattern of the so-called "existential oper-
ator," but rather analogously realizes different kinds of beings. So it is 
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that existing is correlated with essence, but given primacy in the correla-
tion, and so referred to suggestively as "activity" or "actuality." And 
since the actions proper to things follow their mode of existing, and 
"some of the activities of the human being ... are ones which do not 
involve the body, ... it follows that the human being has an esse [or man-
ner of existing] which transcends the body"(538). Such, in brief, is 
Braine's argument to human transcendence which obviates any need to 
speak of "soul," yet which can also "explain and underpin [the] earlier 
way of speaking about souls"(541). For this metaphysical idiom incor-
porates bodily existence integrally; as it concludes "that there comes to 
be in the coming to be of a human being a principle of activity which is a 
focalized subject, which has an esse which transcends the body, and 
which, therefore, does not cease at death," it asserts in the same breath 
that "the human being has no identity apart from its origin and histo-
ry"(542). 
Despite the difficulty of negotiating this book-a difficulty endemic 
to the vast scope of the subject it essays, and enhanced by a formidable 
style of composition-the effort is wondrously rewarded. For he has 
dared to challenge modes of explanation which have acquired a certain 
settled legitimacy, and done so not merely by calling them into question, 
but also attempted to show why they might have appeared attractive for 
want of an alternative. That alternative he has sketched in considerable 
detail, and promises an even greater elaboration of his central construc-
tive arguments about language in a forthcoming volume, tentatively 
entitled "The Expressiveness of Words: the key to the nature of lan-
guage." There would seem to be a vast realm to be explored between 
the polar positions of dualism and materialism, and Braine has begun 
that exploration with us. It becomes all the more crucial to carry it on 
the more we are persuaded by his initial argument portraying both 
polarities as sharing a common dualistic mentality. A finge benefit for 
students is the way in which he introduces them to classical philosophi-
cal notions in a quite contemporary idiom. 
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NOTES 
1. Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1992. 
2. At this point I was reminded of another bugbear with which a group 
of revisionist philosophical theologians had confronted me some years back, 
called "classical theism." That was an exceedingly flat-footed reading of 
some people who had taught me a lot, and had even helped to shape our 
western accounts of divinity, whose work-suitably caricatured-had sup-
posedly contributed more than any other cultural fact to the "death of God" 
in western intellectual life. Those who shaped the caricature promised a 
new lifeline for "theism" in something they presented as "process theolo-
gy." The movement lasted about 25 years and now seems to have evaporat-
ed. But what continued to depress me about it when it was in vogue was 
the way in which it relied on a caricature to get things started. That not only 
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kept certain questions from arising properly, but had the even worse effect 
of releasing graduate students from the need to become in any way adept in 
that presumably discredited way of thinking. I couldn't help but think of 
them as having been shortchanged. 
3. " ... before mental states and events can be identified with brain-states 
or events, or regarded as 'realized in the brain', these mental states and 
events have to be conceived in a way which makes them purely 'inner', logi-
cally segregated from the 'outer world' and the 'outer man' with his behav-
iour in the way which is characteristic of dualism"(23). 
4. Bill Moyers' recent series on PBS: "Healing and the Mind" focused 
some of these indicators. 
5. He distances his account from that of John Searle, who while he 
"may boldly declare that 'perception is an Intentional and causal transaction 
between mind and the world' [Intentionality (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1983),49] and that 'action, like perception, is a causal 
Intentional transaction between mind and the world'[Jbid., 88], but it 
emerges that in each case we have two components, an Intentional compo-
nent (the visual experience or experience of acting) and a physical compo-
nent between which there is to be a causal relation" (103). 
6. The Reality of Time and the Existence of God (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1988) 108-112, 138-161; see my review in Faith and Philosophy 7 (1990) 362-65. 
